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Dr. Marcelo de Araujo, Rio de Janeiro / Brazil
* 
 
What is Become of the Rights of Men? Are You the Only Men who Have 
Rights? Moral Contractarianism and the Legitimation of Universal Human 
Rights 
 
Abstract:  In  this  article  I  advance  an  account  of  human  rights  as  individual  claims  that  can  be 
justified within the conceptual framework of social contract theories. The contractarian approach at 
issue here aims, initially, at a justification of morality at large, and then at the specific domain of 
morality which contains human rights concepts. The contractarian approach to human rights has to 
deal with the problem of universality, i.e. how can human rights be ‘universal’? I deal with this 
problem  by  examining  the  relationship  between  moral  dispositions  and  what  I  call  ‘diffuse  legal 
structure’. 
Keywords: human rights, contractarianism, Jeremy Bentham, moral dispositions, justice, diffuse legal 
structure 
 
The relationship between the concept of human rights and the tradition of ‘social contract’ 
theories may be considered from two different perspectives. On the one hand, the very idea of 
human rights – of rights human beings would have solely in virtue of their being human 
beings – cannot be dissociated, from a historical point of view, from the tradition of political 
thought which emerged in the seventeenth century with Hugo Grotius and, later, with John 
Locke and which tried to ground the legitimacy of political authority by means of the idea of 
a ‘social contract’. For this tradition, the contract, whether an actual or only an hypothetical 
one, is a procedure by means of which individuals would create a political order in the context 
of which their ‘natural rights’ – rights they would already possess previously to the enactment 
of  any  contract  –  would  be  protected.  The  contract,  therefore,  would  not  generate  the 
individuals’ rights, at any rate not those rights they would already possess in virtue of their 
being  human  beings.  Contractarianism,  in  this  sense,  refers  to  a  wide  range  of  political 
theories which take for granted the basic premise that human beings are by nature bearers of 
some  legitimate  moral  rights.  But  the  nature  of  such  rights  has  not  been  traditionally 
examined in the context contractarianism itself. This perspective within the tradition of social 
contract theories, thus, does not really ground human rights. It assumes that there are some 
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natural  or  innate  rights,  and  relies  upon  some  non-contractarian  moral  theory  for  a 
justification of them. 
On the other hand, a more recent development in the tradition of contractarianism has 
tried to advance a conception of morality entirely derived from the idea of a contract. I will 
refer  to  this  recent  development  within  the  tradition  of  contractarianism  as  ‘moral 
contractarianism’ as opposed to ‘political contractarianism’. Moral contractarianism denies 
that there are any rights or duties which individuals would have solely in virtue of their being 
human beings. Human rights are ‘human’, according to this specific sort of social contract 
theory, not because nature or God has endowed human beings with such rights, nor because 
human reason discovers them as the counterpart of a ‘categorical imperative’ the validity of 
which would be unrelated to  the interests and dispositions  that individuals  actually have. 
Human rights are ‘human’ because they are created by human beings themselves. Human 
rights, conceived in this light, are the result of a rational reflection on how to implement the 
most basic interests we could possibly ascribe to any human beings. But it is important to bear 
in  mind  now  that  moral  contractarianism,  as  it  has  been  defended  by  some  of  its  most 
prominent advocates such as J. L. Mackie, David Gauthier and, in the context of German 
philosophy, Peter Stemmer, and Norbert Hoester, is not a theory about human rights. Moral 
contractarianism is basically concerned with an elucidation of the structure of morality in 
terms of a cooperative scheme to which self-interested individuals would agree to adhere for 
the  sake  of  mutual  advantage.  But  moral  contractarianism  leaves  open  both  the  question 
relative to the content of morality and the question relative to the moral duties incumbent 
upon the state in the exercise of political authority. 
The task of a contractarian legitimation of human rights consists, therefore, in providing 
reasons for the thesis that every human being is entitled to raise a number of legitimate claims 
against the state, irrespective of his or her nationality, ethnic background, religious creed, 
sexual preference, skin colour, political orientation, etc. These claims are, in simple outlines, 
of two sorts. On the one hand, they establish an ambit of immunity against state interference 
in the private life of individuals. And, on the one hand, they also impose on the state the duty 
to provide every individual with the minimal material means which should enable one to 
pursue a conception of the good life of his or her own choice. The first group of claims 
constitutes, broadly speaking, the so-called class of civil and political rights, whereas the 
second group relates to the so-called social, economic, and cultural rights. The way, if any, 
the first group relates to the second group concerns a question which, albeit philosophically  
3 
relevant, will not be examined here.
1 This question raises a number of problems which affect 
not only a contractarian legitimation of human rights, but practically any other human  rights 
theory. 
Another question which a contractarian approach must face, and which seems not to 
undermine other human rights theories, is the following: if a human right is a human creation, 
rather than a kind of natural entity every human being would be  the bearer of solely on the 
grounds of his or her being a human being, then, at first glance, it is not clear how they could 
be used as a standard for the assessment of the moral quality of state power. For the prospect 
of appealing to manmade rights in order to assess the moral quality of manmade rights seem 
to involve a circular reasoning. Why, after all, should we suppose that moral norms  – 
expressed in the vocabulary of human rights – are more reliable than state norms? Part of the 
attraction exerted by the idea of human rights, since at least the publication of the Declaration 
of the Rights of Men and the Citizens in 1789, stems precisely from the assumption that 
human rights,  as natural  entities,  would  function as  a non-manmade standard in  order to 
evaluate the morality of manmade norms. For the natural law conception of human rights, the 
aim of the state should be, indeed, to guarantee that individuals’ natural rights shall not be 
violated. This idea is clearly conveyed in the second article of the Declaration of 1789: ‘The 
aim of all political association is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of 
man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.’ Yet, once it 
has been assumed – as moral contractarianism does – that there are no natural rights at all, but 
only manmade rights, it seems that the very idea of  human rights should be replaced by 
another form of moral evaluation of state power devoid of the metaphysical commitments 
which render the concept of ‘natural rights’ so problematical. The thesis that the so-called 
‘natural and imprescriptible’ rights of men are but a philosophical fiction, to be replaced with 
a non-metaphysical moral standard, was clearly defended, for instance, by Jeremy Bentham 
shortly after the Declaration of 1789 appeared. 
In  a  text  known  as  Anarchical  Fallacies,  Bentham  directs  a  twofold  attack  on  the 
tenability of the philosophical ideas underlying the Declaration of 1789. Firstly, Bentham 
argues that the advocates of natural rights do not draw a clear-cut distinction between the 
concept of interest and the concept of right. And secondly, he also argues that the adoption of 
the so-called ‘natural rights of the men’ as the standard on the basis of which state norms 
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should be evaluated would inevitably lead to political chaos – to anarchy. As far as the first 
points is concerned, Bentham’s thesis was that no matter how reasonable an interest may be, 
an interest, taken in itself, is neither a right nor a moral claim of any sort, but only a wish that 
a certain state of affairs obtains. Even interests which can be quite unproblematically ascribed 
to every human being, such as the interest in not being oppressed, or the interest in not having 
one’s property usurped, are not in themselves kinds of rights, but at most a reason to create a 
system of norms in the context of which one’s wish not to be oppressed or robbed might 
acquire a new status, namely: to become one’s right. Bentham’s point, thus, is that without 
the sort of institutional support generated in the context of a political community, one’s claim 
against possible threats to one’s life is not yet a reference to any rights at all. As Bentham puts 
it in an often-quoted passage from Anarchical Fallacies:  
 
‘That which has no existence cannot be destoryed – that which cannot be destroyed cannot require anything to 
preserve it from destruction. Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical 
nonsense, - nonsense upon stilts.’ 
 
‘In proportion to the want of happiness resulting from the want of rights, a reason exists for wishing that there 
were such things as rights. But reasons for wishing there were such things as rights, are not rights; – a reason for 
wishing that a certain right were established, is not that right – want is not supply – hunger is not bread.’
2 
 
For Bentham, the supposition that there are ‘natural and imprescriptible’ rights, therefore, 
constitutes a fallacy resulting from a conceptual confusion about our reasons for creating 
rights, and the rights themselves. But it is important to notice that although Bentham remained 
adamant to the thesis that there cannot be rights outside of a political community, he did not 
seek to establish the limits of state authority on the grounds of a contractarian moral theory. 
Bentham was, in this regard, an advocate of utilitarianism, not contractarianism. On the other 
hand, Bentham’s attempt to defend the principle of utility as the ‘test of morality’ without 
appealing to metaphysical premises has been much criticised. Some critics even argue that, at 
this crucial point, Bentham’s utilitarianism was only another version of a natural law moral 
theory.
3 Nevertheless, the problems underlying the attempt to ground a political morality in 
accordance with utilitarian moral principles  – whether or not with reference to the idea of 
human  rights  –  should  not  concern  us  here.  I  assume  that  the  first  aspect  of  Bentham’s 
onslaught  on  the  Declaration  of  1789  is  correct:  reasons  to  create  rights  should  not  be 
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confused with rights themselves. I leave here unexamined though Bentham’s own alternative 
to a human rights theory, for I am not interested here in the utilitarian approach to human 
rights, but in the contractarian approach. I would like now to turn now to the second aspect of 
Bentham’s criticism: why does he refer to the idea of human rights as anarchical? 
Bentham believed that, because human rights are a sort of philosophical fiction, it would 
be unwise to ground a political community on the basis of such vague ideas. He did not deny 
that the existing political order in France, previous to the Revolution of 1789, was unjust. But 
he  did  deny  that  an  insurrection  against  unjust  laws  should  be  justified  in  the  name  of 
supposedly fictional entities such as human rights. As Bentham puts it:  
 
‘The revolution, which threw the government into the hands of penners and adopters of this declaration, having 
been the effect of insurrection, the grand effect is to justify the cause. But by justifying it, they invite it: in 
justifying past insurrection, they plant and cultivate a propensity to perpetual insurrection in time future; they 
sow the seeds of anarchy broad-cast: in justifying the demolition of existing authorities, they undermine all 
future ones, their own consequently in the number.’
4 
 
This second aspect of Bentham’s attack on the Declaration of 1789 does not directly aim at a 
conceptual problem. Bentham suspected that the ideal of protection of human rights would 
not have the capacity to produce a stable and secure political order. For, in the name of human 
rights, individuals might feel entitled to insurge against the established political authority 
whenever their thought their natural rights had been infringed. Thus, Bentham concludes, 
anarchy  rather  than  a  well-ordered  government  would  prevail.  This  conclusion,  however, 
turned out to prove mistaken. 
In the course of twentieth century most states have committed themselves to the ideal of 
protection of human rights. New declarations of human rights have been issued, such as, for 
instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), The European Convention on 
Human Rights (1950), and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, along 
with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). Several 
international human rights treaties have been adopted, and bodies such as the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights have been established to 
ensure the enforcement of human rights at an international level. Moreover, a series of non-
governmental organisations, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International were 
created for the promotion of human rights both at a domestic and at an international level. 
There is – it is safe to say – a widespread practice of human rights. Thus, contrary to the 
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scenario Bentham forecast toward the end of eighteenth century, the institutionalised practice 
of human rights did not degenerate into anarchy. Quite on the opposite, failure to engage in 
this practice has been often associated with the emergence of dictatorships, major political 
upheavals, civil wars, and genocides. 
Engagement in the practice of human rights can take place in different forms. It may 
occur,  for  instance,  at  an  individual  level  inasmuch  as  one  supports  a  human  rights 
organisation;  it  may  take  place  at  a  collective  level  through  organised  protest  and 
denunciation of human rights violations; it can occur at a state-level through the incorporation 
of human right laws into the constitution of a state; and it can also occur at an international 
level  through  endorsement  of  human  rights  treaties,  or  participation  in  humanitarian 
interventions. It hardly needs mention, however, that the practice of human rights has not 
prevented  governments  to  act  unjustly  towards  minorities,  women,  homosexuals,  ethnic 
groups, etc. – both within and beyond their territories. But it is through the vocabulary of 
human rights that such acts of injustice have traditionally been referred to over the last sixty 
years. A contractarian legitimation of human rights, then, consists in providing reasons for 
engagement in this practice. But it is important to notice that the contractarian approach does 
not  assume  that  previously  to  the  emergence  of  this  practice  individuals  were  already 
endowed with human rights. For human rights are created, promoted, or defended in the very 
context of this practice. The very act of violation of human rights can only exist within the 
broader context of a practice which condemns such acts. Actually, even the question about the 
philosophical foundations of human rights is posed against the background of an ongoing 
practice – the practice of human rights. What is at issue in the contractarian legitimation of 
human rights, therefore, is the question about the reasons which may be advanced for the 
existence of, and further support for this practice. 
Moral contractarianism poses the same question vis-à-vis the practice of morality: which 
reasons do we have to engage in and to support our moral commitments? It is quite clear that 
the practice of morality did not arise out of a ‘contract’ amongst self-interested individuals. 
This practice may well have originated, and was traditionally defended, on the grounds of 
religious  and  metaphysical  ideas.  But  the  reasons  at  the  origins  of  a  practice  need  not 
necessarily be the same reasons for one’s engagement in, and overt support for this practice. 
The  task  of  a  contractarian  moral  theory,  as  Gauthier  puts  it,  consists  in  a  ‘rational 
reconstruction’ of morality, leaving aside the question relative to the factual roots of our 
moral  ideas  and  moral  dispositions.
5  The  answer  moral  contractarianism  gives  for  the 
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question about the justification of morality is that, whatever the origins of morality may be, 
we would have reasons to create and support a system of self-imposed constraints in order to 
preclude  individuals  to  advance  their  own  good  to  the  detriment  of  the  good  of  other 
individuals.  But  our  reasons  to  create  this  system  are  not  themselves  moral  reasons.
6  In 
seeking to establish a system of rules for mutual advantage, we must not be guided by the 
prior moral intuition that it is always wrong to better one’s own position by worsening the 
position of others, so that a system of rules would be created for the concretization of an 
intuition the validity of which would be unrelated to the system itself. One’s sole reason to 
engage in the practice of abstaining from promoting one’s own good without concern for the 
good of other individuals may be the realisation that it is deleterious to one’s own good to act 
in a predatory way. Indeed, most of the basic goods an individual may be possibly interested 
in, such as the protection of one’s own life against murder, or the preservation of property 
over the objects one creates, transforms, or acquires by means of one’s own work, are goods 
which are generated on a collective basis. They cannot exist without the cooperation of other 
individuals. This means that one will not be able succeed in obtaining these goods for oneself, 
unless one is also willing to provide other individuals with the same goods. Morality, thus, 
according to moral contractarianism, has a do ut des structure: one refrains from being a 
menace to  other individuals  to  the extent other individuals  do not  represent  a menace to 
oneself; one helps other individuals with the expectation that they will also come to one’s 
succour in similar circumstances.
7 The idea of a ‘contract’ in this context is a methodological 
procedure we recur to in order to examine the rationality of our moral practices, regardless of 
their  factual  origins.  Thus,  the  practice  of  morality  may  be  considered  rational,  if  we 
recognise that we would agree to create this practice, by means of a ‘contract’ with other self-
interested  individuals,  if  this  practice  did  not  yet  exist.  But  the  realisation  that  such  an 
agreement has never really occurred is not relevant for moral contractarianism, for what is at 
issue here is not its capacity to explain how our moral practices came into existence in the 
first  place,  but  how  we  can  justify  their  existence,  and  support  its  preservation,  without 
appealing  to  religious  beliefs,  metaphysical  assumptions,  or  evolution  theory.  Moral 
contractarianism, as we can see, does justice to Bentham’s first criticism, for it does not 
mistake our reasons to create a system of rules for the rules themselves. Yet, once a system of 
rules  has  been  created,  there  arises  the  question  as  to  how  to  ensure  that  self-interested 
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individuals will constantly abide by the rules which they have themselves created, even if 
they would occasionally fare better by flouting these rules. At this juncture, we can see how 
the contractarian account of human rights  I advance here differs from  other contractarian 
approaches to morality. I would like to turn to this problem now. 
In order to enforce compliance with the rules the individuals imposed upon themselves, it 
is necessary to create an instrument which has the power to sanction the individuals who flout 
the rules. According to  the contractarian account of human rights, this power to sanction 
should be ascribed to the state, and only to the state. No other institution such as, for instance, 
the  church,  family  clans,  militias,  or  private  individuals  is  entitled  to  play  this  role.  But 
because the state has alone the power to sanction breaches of the rules which the individuals 
imposed upon themselves, there is always the danger that the state itself becomes a threat to 
its citizens, rather than an institutional instrument to guarantee the fulfilment of their most 
basic interests. From a historical perspective, the ideal of protection of human rights emerged 
exactly as an attempt to prevent the state from growing into such a threat. In the history of the 
practice of human rights the limits of state authority were initially conceived of in terms of a 
duty to respect the natural rights of men. State authority, then, would fail to be considered 
legitimate, if it were exerted through the violation of the rights individuals would supposedly 
possess previously to their participation in a political community such as the state. But the 
contractarian  ‘rational  reconstruction’  of  human  rights,  on  the  other  hand,  does  not 
presuppose the existence of rights of any sort previously to the establishment of an instrument 
to sanction breaches of the rules. – Contractarianism has learnt Bentham’s lesson. Previously 
to the existence of the state, along with its power to punish, what exists is the individual’s 
wish to have an instrument which ensures that their most basic interests – interest in not being 
murdered  or  robbed,  for  instance  –  will  be  fulfilled.  Human  rights  are  the  institutional 
concretization of this wish. The interests which are aimed at through the creation of human 
rights are very basic ones, for they can be attributed to every human being. For this reason, 
Otfried Höffe, for instance, argues that a sort of minimal anthropology underlies the idea of 
human rights, for these rights are relative to minimal conditions which must obtain whatever 
conception  of  the  good  life  a  human  being  may  reasonably  seek  to  pursue.  Because  the 
fulfilment of these basic interests are a condition for the fulfilment of whatever other interests 
a  human  being  may  have,  Höffe  calls  them,  following  Kant’s  idea  of  ‘conditions  of 
possibility’, ‘transcendental interests.’
8 
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As we can see, for the contractarian approach to human rights, as it has been put forth 
thus far, human rights can only exist in the context of the state. But, it might be objected now, 
is this account of human rights a satisfactory one? This account seems to throw over board the 
universality claim that the concept of human right has traditionally raised.
9 For in order to 
have human rights an individual must be lucky enough to be part of a state where the 
fulfilment of his or her ‘transcendental interests’ is warranted by constitutional law. Outsiders, 
on the other hand, can only wish to have human rights, either by becoming member of a state 
where human rights do already exist (and one must be, again, lucky enough to be accepted as 
a new member), or by changing the political order in his or her own state, an option which, as 
we all know, is not without risks. In order to advance a more comprehensive account of 
human rights from a contractarian perspective, so as to make sense of the universality claim, 
it is necessary now to turn our attention to the problem of compliance in the context of moral 
contractarianism. 
Moral contractarianism involves a conception of practical rationality understood in terms 
of  utility  maximization.  A  choice  is  considered  rational  to  the  extent  that  it  is  likely  to 
maximize one’s own interest. But it is important to notice now that the kind of rational choice 
at the heart of moral contractarianism is not one which aims at a specific action, considered in 
isolation  from  other  actions.  The  rational  choice  at  issue  in  the  context  of  moral 
contractarianism is one about a disposition – about a way of making choices.
10 The basic idea 
here is that, for the sake of utility maximization, it would be rational to choose to be moved 
by a kind of disposition which will prompt one to  curb the full maximization of one’s own 
interest for the benefit of other persons. A person disposed to promote his or her own interest, 
without concern for the interest of other persons, cannot expect to be granted participation in a 
scheme of cooperation for mutual advantage, for her behaviour represents a threat for the 
success if this scheme. Yet, she must participate in this scheme, if she wants to fulfil her 
‘transcendental interests.’ Thus, for the sake of utility-maximisation, this person must choose 
to be moved by a disposition – a ‘sense of justice’, as Gauthier calls it – which will prompt 
her to curb the full maximisation of her interests to a point that will not be detrimental to the 
maximisation  of  the  interests  of  other  persons.  For  either  she  relinquishes  the  full-
maximisation  of  her  interests,  and  pursues  their  maximisation  in  such  a  way  as  to 
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accommodate the constrained maximisation of other persons’ interests, or she will not fulfil 
her interests at all – or at any rate not with a degree of satisfaction she might expect to fulfil 
through cooperation with other individuals. For it would be irrational for other individuals to 
interact with a person who lacks a sense of justice, i.e. a person who is willing to reap the 
fruits of cooperation, without being prompt to cooperate in return. As Gauthier puts it: 
 
‘No one wants a person who altogether lacks a sense of justice as a fellow cooperator, for such a person may not 
reasonably be expected to be adequately disposed to uphold the terms on which interaction is mutually desirable. 
Even persons who would cooperate in order to victimize others wish for fair dealing among themselves. Since 
social cooperation is necessary if human beings are to survive, reproduce, and flourish, we may suppose that 
each person will want her fellows to possess a sense of justice, will prefer to interact with others possessing such 
a sense rather than others lacking it, and will want herself to possess a sense of justice as it increases their 
willingness to interact with her and so affords her a fuller realization of her own concerns.’
11 
 
Moral contractarianism, thus, deals with the problem of compliance in a different way: a 
person moved by a sense of justice will abide by the rules, not for the fear of being punished 
by the state, but because she realises that although the performance of an unjust action may 
occasionally pay off, being an unjust person does not. And, in being a just person, she will not 
indulge herself in occasional breaches of law. These two different solutions to the problem of 
compliance are not incompatible. They are, rather, complementary. Indeed, since it is not 
always clear the extent to which a person is truly moved by a sense of justice, individuals may 
establish state power, after having created morality, in order to make sure that compliance 
will be enforced. Thus, the claims of morality can be called ‘anterior’ to the establishment of 
state power without being in any relevant sense a ‘natural’ state of affairs. The social life in 
the context of a political community created for the protection of human rights – rights the 
individuals themselves have created – may, in its turn, strengthen the moral dispositions of its 
citizens. 
A person who has developed a sense of justice, in the context of a political community 
where human rights do already exist, will recognise other individuals as bearers of certain 
legitimate moral claims. To the extent that this person is moved by a sense of justice, he or 
she will not treat other individuals solely as a means for the constraint maximization of his or 
her own interest; this person will behave towards them as bearers of certain basic rights. But 
who, in fact, are the other individuals at issue here? Are they his or her own fellow citizens 
(or co-nationals), or are they, rather, human beings at large? This is an important point, for it 
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enables us now to deal with the problem of the universality claim which the concept of human 
rights raises. 
In having a sense of justice, one may ‘recognise’ that it is morally wrong to do certain 
things  to  other  individuals,  even  if  the  other  individuals  are  not  part  of  our  political 
community. For this reason, one may find oneself ‘treating’ other individuals as real bearer of 
human rights – the same rights one actually has. Inasmuch as one has a sense of justice, one 
may come to ‘behave’ towards other individuals as though they were, no less than oneself, 
entitled to raise certain right-claims against those persons and institutions which neglect their 
‘transcendental interests’, even considering that these claims, formally speaking, are not really 
rights, but the expression of the wish to have the same human rights one has. Among fellow 
citizens, the existence of human rights does not depend on a simple mutual ‘recognition’ that 
they – the fellow citizens – are bearers of rights; the existence of human rights depends, 
indeed, on something more than a respectful ‘treatment’ and ‘behaviour’ towards one another: 
it depends upon the existence of law, i.e. a common power capable of turning their respective 
interests into individual rights. Nonetheless, one’s ‘recognition’ that  other individuals can 
make  certain  legitimate  claims,  along  with  one’s  adoption  of  a  kind  of  ‘treatment’  or 
‘behaviour’ towards them and the institutions which disregard their ‘transcendental interests’ 
can exert enormous influence on the political order beyond the limits of one’s own state. 
Through ‘recognition’ one expresses one’s wish that individuals other than one’s own co-
nationals  also  have  human  rights.  Through  the  relevant  ‘treatment’  and  ‘behaviour’  one 
endeavours to fulfil this wish. The treatment and behaviour at issue here include actions as 
diverse  as:  campaigning  for  international  human  rights  organisations;  pressing  one’s 
government  to  sign  human  rights  treaties  or,  as  the  case  may,  to  respect  these  treaties; 
demonstrating against human rights violations; voting for politicians who publically support 
the ideal of protection of human rights; or fostering debates and publications on human rights, 
both at an academic and at broader level, etc. These actions represent an enlargement of the 
practice  of  human  rights  –  a  practice  which  was  initially  restricted  to  the  limits  of  state 
boundaries. It is only in the context of this more encompassing, transnational practice that we 
can,  now,  account  for  the  universality  which  the  concept  of  human  rights  raises. 
Contractarianism affords reasons for one’s engagement in these manifold practices. These 
reasons are derived from a sense of justice – a human disposition the rationality of which, as 
we  have  seen,  can  be  explained  on  contractarian  grounds,  regardless  of  its  religious, 
metaphysical or evolutionary roots. But it is important to stress that a sense of justice alone 
does not generate any human rights.  
12 
This rational reconstruction of the universality claim raised by the concept of human 
rights also enables us to understand, from a historical point of view, how the practice of 
human rights actually acquired the character of universality it has at the present time. Indeed, 
the  human  rights  rhetoric,  which  arouse  in  the  wake  of  the  French  Revolution  and  the 
publication of the Declaration of the Rights of Men and the Citizens, was initially thought of 
as a policy to be adopted within the strict limits of state boundaries. And even then it was not 
meant  to  apply  to  every  human  being  as  such.  Instead,  rather  taking  the  text  of  the 
Declaration  quite literally, it was  meant  to  apply to  every  man. This  left  out,  of course, 
women and children. Early supporters of the Declaration who argued for equal rights for 
women  and  illegitimate  children  were  either  simply  ignored  or  brutally  executed,  as  for 
instance the playwright and political activist Olympe de Gouges, author of the Declaration of 
the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen (1791).
12 The real establishment of human rights 
for women, children, black persons, or individuals belonging to ethnic minorities was a very 
slow – and not always peaceful – process in many states, and it is still in the making in many 
parts of the world. But this process had as one of its primary goals to create a domestic legal 
structure within which fellow citizens would be entitled to raise the same basic claims any 
human being is expected to raise for the protection his or her own life. The question as to the 
claims  raised  by  other  human  beings,  living  outside  of  the  reach  of  this  domestic  legal 
structure, was not considered to be a matter one should really be concerned about, except 
perhaps for the sake of charity or benevolence toward human beings living in other states. 
This, of course, represented a ‘two measure’ attitude relative to the idea of human rights, for 
at the same time one state would recognise the human rights of its own citizens, it might well 
behave in a quite different way towards human beings beyond the reach its constitutional law. 
Although Bentham was not himself an advocate of human rights, he called attention as early 
as 1793 to the ‘two measures’ of the human rights policy the French revolutionaries had 
towards their colonies. In a text entitled Emancipate your colonies! Address to the National 
Convention of France, Bentham writes: 
   
‘You choose your own government, why are not other people to choose theirs? Do you seriously mean to govern 
the world, and do you call that liberty? What is become of the rights of men? Are you the only men who have 
rights? Alas! My fellow citizens, have you two measures?’
13 
 
                                                           
12 Long before the French Revolution, the English feminist writer Mary Astell had already provotically asked: ‘If 
all Men are born free, how is it that all Women are born Slaves? (Some Reflections upon Marriage, 1700). 
13 Jeremy Bentham, ‘Emancipate your colonies! Address to the National Convention of France, A
o 1793’, in: 
Rights, Representation, and Reform: Nonsense upon Stilts and other Writings on the French Revolution, eds. 
Philip Schofield / Cyprian Blamires, 2002, 292.  
13 
It was not until the second half of twentieth century that the international community started 
to  tackle  the  ‘two  measures’  question  more  seriously.  In  the  aftermath  of  the  Universal 
Declarations of Human Rights of 1948 an ever-growing network of transnational treatises, 
international  courts,  and  non-governmental  institutions  began  to  emerge  to  the  extent  of 
forming today a diffuse legal structure in condition to address human rights issues in diverse 
far-flung  regions  of  the  world.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  mention  that  this  diffuse  legal 
structure is anything but perfect. But it is only in the context of this diffuse legal structure that 
we can speak nowadays of ‘universal human rights’. Moral contractarianism, as I have tried to 
show  in  this  article,  give  us  reason  to  support  the  enlargement  and  maintenance  of  this 
diffuse, international legal structure. 
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